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Abstract - We show, by means of brief demonstration, that the underlying transmission 
protocol in [1] cannot determine dishonest paths when adversaries collaborate. Hence, 
this method of tolerating mixed adversaries on an asynchronous network is flawed. 
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1 Introduction 
At Asiacrypt 2002, Srinathan, Kumar and Rangan presented a paper describing a method 
to communicate securely over a completely asynchronous incomplete network, tolerating 
mixed adversaries [1]. The method is based on a transmission protocol, which first 
identifies the set of faulty paths across the network, then proceeds to use the remaining 
honest paths for communication. However, there is a problem with the first part of the 
protocol that identifies the faulty paths. 
 
In a network of n paths p0, p1, …, pn from A to B, the transmission protocol allows A and 
B to determine the honest paths in the following way: 
 
1. A splits a verifiable secret S into n shares s0, s1, …, sn 
2. A sends si along path pi to B (for i = 0 to n) 
3. B tries to reconstruct S from (s0, s1, …, sn) 
− if S is okay then all paths p0, p1, …, pn are honest 
− if S is not okay then B must assume that any number of shares may have been 
tampered with and so has the tuple T = (s’0, s’1, …, s’n) where si may or may 
not be equal to s’i (for i = 0 to n) and therefore sends T to A along all paths p0, 
p1, …, pn 
4. Let Ti be the tuple A receives from B along the path pi (for i = 0 to n) 
− if A’s original share sj matches the corresponding received share s’j (for j = 0 to 
n) in tuple Ti (for i = 0 to n) then path pj is honest, and so by comparison of the 
shares in Tj to the original shares, the honest and fault paths are correctly 
determined 
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2 Demonstration 
We give two examples; firstly to demonstrate how the protocol works, and secondly to 
highlight why it is flawed. 
 
2.1 Correct Example 
The following example demonstrates that this protocol gives a correct result, even if n -1 
paths are faulty and they collaborate: 
 
1. Suppose there are 3 paths (n = 3) from A to B, two of which are faulty (p0 and p2) 
2. A sends s0, s1 and s2 along paths p0, p1 and p2 respectively 
3. As p0 and p2 are faulty, B actually receives T = (s’0, s1 and s’2), and so the 
reconstructed secret is not okay 
4. B sends T to A along p0, p1 and p2 
5. As p0 and p2 are faulty, they can modify their tuples (T0 and T2) to indicate no 
changes in their shares 
6. A receives T0 = (s0, s1 and s2), T1 = (s’0, s1 and s’2), and T 2= (s0, s1 and s2), which 
collectively indicate that p1 is honest and p0 and p2 are faulty 
 
Despite the faulty paths collaborating (by correcting each other’s shares in their tuple), 
the tuple sent along the single honest path cannot be changed. 
2.2 Counter Example 
The above example showed how collaborating faulty paths, by changing their 
collaborative faulty tuple shares, can still be identified. However, they can also change 
the shares of honest paths in their own tuples. The following example demonstrates why 
this protocol fails when faulty paths collaborate to incriminate honest paths: 
 
1. Again, suppose there are 3 paths (n = 3) from A to B, two of which are faulty (p0 
and p2) 
2. A sends s0, s1 and s2 along paths p0, p1 and p2 respectively 
3. As p0 and p2 are faulty, B actually receives T = (s’0, s1 and s’2), and so the 
reconstructed secret is not okay 
4. B sends T to A along p0, p1 and p2 
5. As p0 and p2 are faulty, they can modify their tuples (T0 and T2) to indicate no 
changes in their shares, and changes in the honest shares 
6. A receives T0 = (s0, s’1 and s2), T1 = (s’0, s1 and s’2), and T 2= (s0, s’1 and s2), 
which collectively cannot determine any honest path 
 
The tuples from the honest paths (T1) indicate that the true faulty paths are faulty, but the 
tuples from the faulty paths (T0 and T2) indicate that the true honest paths are faulty. 
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Since the number of honest paths is unknown, irrespective of the protocol, then the only 
information that the protocol provides is the presence of at least one faulty path. 
3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, we have highlighted that the transmission protocol in [1] is flawed if 
adversaries collaborate. In particular, when collaborating adversaries conspire to hide 
their own share changes and incriminate honest paths’ shares. 
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